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I. INTRODUCTION 
At common law, an interested director was barred from participat-
ing in corporate decisions in which he had an interest, and therefore “dis-
interested” directors became desirable. This concept of the disinterested 
director developed into the model of an “independent director” and was 
advocated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Com-
mission) and court decisions as a general ideal in a variety of situations. 
The SEC’s policy preference for independent directors was embodied in 
the Investment Company Act of 1940
1
 and highlighted in some early 
cases.
2
 Although the term “independent director” is often used rather 
loosely, it should be understood to mean a director without any general 
conflict of interest with the corporation. An interested director, by con-
trast, is a director who has a conflicting interest in a particular transac-
tion. 
The SEC’s view of the need for independent directors should be 
understood in the context of Adolph Berle’s theory of the 1930s. It posits 
that shareholders had abdicated control of public corporations to corpo-
rate managers, and fiduciary duties needed to be imposed upon corporate 
boards to compensate for this loss of shareholder control.
3
 Berle’s writ-
ings laid the foundation for shareholder primacy as the theory of the 
                                                             
* Centennial Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Dennis J. Block Center for the Study of Inter-
national Business Law at Brooklyn Law School. This paper was presented at a conference at the 
University of New South Wales sponsored by the Centre for Law, Markets and Regulation of the 
University of New South Wales and The Adolph A. Berle Center on Corporations, Law and Society 
of Seattle University School of Law. Helpful comments were also provided at a presentation at a 
Brooklyn Law School summer faculty workshop. A Brooklyn Law School summer research stipend 
was of assistance in completing this project. The author acknowledges with gratitude the research 
assistance of Brooklyn Law School students Margaret Corchado and Kevin Cooper. 
 1. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1, 80a-2(19), 80a-10 (2012). 
 2. See infra text accompanying note 10. 
 3. A. A. Berle Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 
1365 (1932); A. A. Berle Jr., Corporate Powers As Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049–
50 (1931). 
776 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:775 
firm—a theory embraced by the SEC, which viewed itself as a surrogate 
for investors. Pursuant to this theory, a corporation is managed for the 
benefit of its shareholders. 
The SEC has generally succeeded in imposing its corporate govern-
ance views in the wake of scandals. Following the sensitive payments 
enforcement program of the 1970s, the SEC embarked on an activist cor-
porate governance reform program. During the merger and acquisition 
frenzy of the 1980s, the SEC used the Williams Act
4
 to foster the view 
that the market for corporate control constrained incompetent managers. 
After the bursting of the technology bubble in 2000 and the financial re-
porting scandals that ensued, the SEC was able to incorporate its views 
on independent directors into the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Sar-
banes–Oxley).5 Following the financial crisis of 2008, the SEC further 
enforced its views on independent directors in the Dodd–Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank).6 
The composition and behavior of securities markets and investors 
has changed drastically since the SEC was established in 1934. Yet, the 
SEC has persisted in its path-dependent view that independent directors, 
ever more stringently defined, should dominate the boards of public 
companies. What is the function and rationale for such directors? If it is 
to assure that corporations comply with laws and regulations imposed on 
public corporations, then they become just another (probably ineffectual) 
gatekeeper. If it is to weaken the power of the CEO, it should be noted 
that there is some doubt whether independent directors can or should do 
so. If it is to be responsive to the needs and views of shareholders, which 
shareholders of an increasingly diverse body should be served? In recent 
years, and particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, aca-
demics and others have been questioning both the shareholder primacy 
model of the firm and the independent director model of board govern-
ance. 
The independent director ideal has not been embraced all over the 
world. Neither has shareholder primacy. In some countries, a director 
representing the controlling shareholder is considered to be not inde-
pendent because one of the goals of corporate governance is the protec-
tion of minority shareholders. Also, where the government is a major 
                                                             
 4. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (modifying Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 13, 
14 and codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78m–n (2006)). 
 5. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7201, 18 U.S.C. § 7201, and 28 U.S.C. § 7201). 
 6. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 42 
U.S.C.). 
2014] Is the Independent Director Model Broken? 777 
shareholder, the independent director model is problematic. After the 
2008 financial crisis, the conflicts between shareholders and creditors 
became more apparent. Should the independent director be independent 
of major shareholders as well as managers in order to preserve and in-
crease the value of the firm? 
I have never been entirely comfortable with the SEC’s view that the 
best public company boards are those composed of directors whose only 
compensation for sitting on a board comes from directors’ fees and who 
have no potentially conflicting business interests (past or present) with 
the company. The debates about independent directors were heated while 
I was a commissioner of the SEC from 1977 to 1980. Afterwards I 
served as an independent director of a large public company for twenty 
years, as a public director of the New York Stock Exchange from 1983 to 
1989, and on the Advisory Committee for the American Law Institute 
Corporate Governance Project.
7
 Many of my views are colored by these 
experiences. In particular, when I was a director, I found the insights of 
inside directors invaluable in decision making. Since 2008, my doubts 
about the independent director model have increased. This Article will 
explore those doubts and suggest that director expertise may be more 
important than director independence. Further, directors should have an 
obligation to the long-term viability of a corporation. Such an obligation 
would infringe upon the shareholder primacy theory of the firm, espe-
cially to the extent that this model encapsulates running the company for 
short-term economic gain. Furthermore, in an institutionalized market-
place, retail shareholders may need to be protected against institutional 
investors.
8
 
Part II of this Article outlines the evolution of the independent di-
rector model as championed by the SEC. Part III discusses criticisms of 
the independent director model. Part IV discusses shareholder primacy 
and sets forth alternatives to the shareholder primacy theory of the firm. 
Part V discuses corporate governance models outside the United States. 
Part VI concludes. 
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II. TWENTIETH-CENTURY SEC VIEWS ON INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS 
A. Early SEC Views 
In re Franchard Corp.9 is generally cited as the first move by the 
SEC into the establishment of corporate governance standards. The 
Commission held that the “integrity of management—its willingness to 
place its duty to public shareholders over personal interests”—is a mate-
rial disclosure item.
10
 The SEC staff had argued in this administrative 
stop-order proceeding that “by identifying members of the board of di-
rectors, [the registrant] impliedly represented that they would provide 
oversight and direction to the registrant’s officers.”11 The Commission 
rejected this theory on the ground that it would “stretch disclosure be-
yond the limitations contemplated by the statutory scheme.”12 The 
Commission believed it was not equipped to evaluate the entire conduct 
of a board in the context of the whole business operations of a company. 
Over time, this limited view of the SEC’s statutory authority and 
expertise gave way to a more activist approach to corporate governance. 
In its reports on the financial collapse of Penn Central, the SEC cited 
lapses by the railroad’s board of directors: “They failed to perceive the 
complexities of the company’s financial operations, problems, or the crit-
ical nature of the company’s financial situation [and] permitted manage-
ment to operate without any effective review or control” because they 
“were uninformed of important developments and activities.”13 
The SEC staff’s view of the need for corporate governance reform 
has generally been aired in the context of corporate scandals. In the early 
1970s, a number of influential voices cried out for federal corporate char-
tering in order to curtail the deleterious influence of giant corporations.
14
 
The SEC then embarked on an activist corporate governance reform pro-
gram in the context of a general post-Watergate hysteria—an effort to 
blame business for a prevailing climate of corruption, a stagflation econ-
omy, and a long-bear market. The immediate spur to this program was 
the questionable foreign payments cases, where approximately 400 pub-
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lic companies consented to injunctions to cease paying commercial 
bribes to foreign government agents in order to obtain business.
15
 Some 
of these consents included the restructuring of a company’s corporate 
board. 
In response to the sensitive payments cases, Congress passed the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
16
 which criminalized the payment of 
bribes to foreign officials.
17
 It also required companies registered with 
the SEC to maintain accurate books and records, and to develop a system 
of internal accounting controls.
18
 This was the first statute in which the 
SEC was given direct power to regulate the internal affairs of public cor-
porations. Ironically, the statute was passed almost simultaneously with a 
Supreme Court decision prohibiting the use of Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act) from 
being used to regulate directorial breaches of fiduciary duty.
19
 According 
to the Court, such an extension of the securities laws would overlap and 
interfere with state corporation law: “Absent a clear indication of con-
gressional intent, we are reluctant to federalize the substantial portion of 
the law of corporations that deals with transactions in securities.”20 
Therefore, the SEC obtained a new power to impact corporate govern-
ance with regard to internal controls at the same time the Court expressed 
the view that Congress did not intend to create a federal corporation law 
by passing the federal securities laws. 
Nevertheless, in a general atmosphere of criticism of business lead-
ers, the corporate governance debate turned to questions of board com-
position and director independence. The SEC embarked on a program to 
influence board structure with a new chairman who believed in inde-
pendent board directors. In April 1977, the SEC announced that it would 
hold public hearings concerning shareholder communications, share-
holder participation in the corporate electoral process, and corporate 
governance in general.
21
 After these hearings, the SEC proposed rules to 
encourage boards to become independent of management by restructur-
ing to include only persons not affiliated with the corporation. 
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 17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (2006). 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2). 
 19. See Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
 20. Id. at 478–79. 
 21. Reexamination of Rules Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participa-
tion in the Corporate Electoral Process, and Corporate Governance Generally, 42 Fed. Reg. 23901-
02 (May 11, 1977). 
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In the view of then-SEC Chairman Harold Williams, a majority of 
board members should be independent, or at the very least a board’s 
nominating, compensation, and audit committees should be composed of 
independent directors.
22
 Williams also recommended that the CEO 
should not serve as chairman of the board. It is interesting that Chairman 
Williams was not a fan of shareholder primacy. He criticized sharehold-
ers who purchased stock to hold for a short period of time to sell at a 
profit, stating: “They do not perceive themselves as owners of the com-
pany, but rather as investors—or speculators—in its income stream and 
the stock market assessment of its securities.”23 Although he believed 
that a board of independent directors could be a countervailing force to 
CEO power—and thus necessary to make corporations more accounta-
ble—his concept of corporate accountability went far beyond that owed 
to shareholders:  
As a society, we depend on private enterprise to serve as the instru-
ment through which to accomplish a wide variety of goals—full 
employment, equal economic opportunity, environmental protec-
tion, energy independence, and others. When viewed in light of 
these social implications, corporations must be seen, as to a degree, 
more than purely private institutions, and corporate profits as not 
entirely an end in themselves, but also as one of the resources which 
corporations require in order to discharge their responsibilities.
24
 
The view that corporations are quasi-public institutions that should 
be held accountable to a number of constituencies has a long history, but 
the independent director movement did not usher in an era of corporate 
accountability to employees, customers, or the public. Rather, the model 
of the board of independent directors accompanied a shift from a manag-
er-centric corporate governance system to a shareholder-centric system.
25
 
Disclosure regulation was the only mechanism the SEC had for ef-
fecting boardroom reform during the SEC corporate governance program 
of the 1970s. Accordingly, the SEC proposed to require all corporations 
subject to the SEC’s proxy rules to label their directors as “independent” 
                                                             
 22. Harold M. Williams, Chairman, Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Sixth Annual 
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or “affiliated.”26 These rules aroused a storm of protest and the SEC’s 
final rules required only a brief description of “significant economic and 
personal relationships . . . between the director and the issuer.”27 Alt-
hough the SEC has generally managed to utilize disclosure requirements 
as a prophylactic device to achieve some modification of corporate con-
duct, the agency chafed at being unable to directly regulate corporate 
behavior. It viewed the absence of any SEC authority to regulate corpo-
rate board structure as a policy error to be corrected. 
During the takeover battles of the 1980s, pressure for independent 
directors arose in court battles where incumbent boards attempted to 
maintain company independence or fight against corporate raiders by 
finding a white knight.
28
 The active merger and acquisition market of this 
decade led to the demise of many established industrial companies. In 
administering the Williams Act, the SEC generally sided with bidders, or 
the interests of Wall Street, in opposition to target companies, or the in-
terests of Main Street.
29
 In retrospect, the takeovers of this period were 
part of the deindustrialization of the United States and may not have been 
entirely positive. Although the U.S. economy arguably became more ef-
ficient and competitive, the manufacturing of goods and many types of 
jobs were outsourced or exported. Finance overtook industry and income 
inequality markedly increased. Some of these issues were debated during 
the November 2012 elections with a hindsight view of the financial crisis 
of 2008. In my opinion, however, the asset bubble of the early years of 
this century, and its bursting in 2008, was the culmination of economic 
and financial regulation problems that should have been apparent in the 
1980s. The SEC focused on defending the market for corporate control 
when perhaps it should have been focusing on the questionable behavior 
of financial investors who were dismantling public corporations for 
short-term shareholder gain. 
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782 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:775 
The merger mania of the 1980s was financed to a significant extent 
with junk bonds emanating from Drexel Burnham Lambert (Drexel). The 
role of that firm in using leverage to take over major industrial compa-
nies continues to be controversial, even after Michael Milken, Drexel’s 
maestro, went to jail for insider trading.
30
 More recently, the spotlight 
has focused on Bain Capital, a Drexel client, which engaged in a number 
of highly leveraged private equity deals in the 1980s that resulted in the 
export of U.S. manufacturing and jobs. 
The directors of target companies who attempted to fend off unwel-
come hostile takeovers during this period were frequently criticized for 
their failure to act independently of management.
31
 But with hindsight, it 
is possible to inquire whether the financial interests that fueled the take-
over boom of the 1980s acted in the public interest or only in the interest 
of stock market speculators. The passage of state-other constituency or 
stakeholder statutes attempted to ameliorate the strong shareholder pri-
macy underpinnings of the Williams Act,
32
 but Delaware did not pass 
such a statute and continued to referee battles between bidders and target 
companies. 
B. Investment Company Governance 
For many years, the SEC enjoyed more success in promoting the 
idea of independent directors for investment companies than for other 
corporations because the securities laws gave the SEC more power to do 
so. Investment company corporations are organized under state law, of-
ten in the state of Maryland.
33
 Under the Investment Company Act of 
1940, at least 40% of the board must be composed of “independent” or 
“disinterested” directors.34 The rationale for this provision was to elimi-
nate conflicts of interest and abuses rampant in the investment trusts of 
the 1920s.
35
 This principle may have originated at the New York Stock 
Exchange, Inc. (NYSE), which made independent representation on the 
boards of investment trusts a requirement for listing in 1931 on the theo-
ry that investor “protection could be most readily obtained by independ-
                                                             
 30. See CHARLES R. GEIST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY 335–42, 358 (1997). 
 31. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
 32. E.g., 15 PA. CONSOL. STATS. ANN. §§ 1711, 1715, 1716, 1717, 2502. 
 33. See Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). 
 34. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. 80 §§ a-2(a)(19), a-10(a), 2(a)(19) (2006). 
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mittee of the Committee on Banking and Currency Committee, 76-768, Part 1, 76th Cong. 8–9, 32–
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ent directors under whose scrutiny and friendly criticism [of] contem-
plated transactions would pass for review.”36 
Initially, the directors of an investment company could not be “af-
filiates” of the investment company, but in 1970 the statute was changed 
to the stricter standard that directors must be “disinterested.”37 However, 
the SEC did not remain satisfied with this amendment, so it advocated 
for further director independence. In 2001, the SEC determined that cer-
tain investment companies, those that rely on certain exemptions by rule, 
were required to have a majority of their boards be disinterested directors 
and have independent legal counsel for the independent directors.
38 
This 
rule was never challenged. 
In 2004, the SEC amended ten widely relied upon exemptive rules 
to enhance the effectiveness of independent directors.
39 
Funds using these 
exemptions were required to have 75% disinterested directors and an 
independent chairman. Other provisions with regard to governance in-
cluded the following: (1) fund directors must perform an evaluation, at 
least once annually, of the effectiveness of the board and its committees, 
and among other things, decide if they are serving on too many fund 
boards; (2) independent directors need to be authorized to hire their own 
employees; and (3) funds need to retain the written materials directors 
consider in approving an advisory contract. Two Commissioners dissent-
ed from the adoption of these rules and the case went to the D.C. Circuit 
Court, which held in Chamber of Commerce v. SEC40 that the SEC had 
the authority to pass the rule mandating a 75% board of independent di-
rectors but did not appropriately consider costs and benefits with regard 
to the separation of the CEO and chairman. Therefore, the court vacated 
the independent chairman rule. Nevertheless, most funds now have at 
least a majority and usually 75% independent directors. Some have inde-
pendent chairmen, but many have a lead director instead.
41
 
The SEC is happy to experiment with its corporate governance ide-
as in the context of investment company regulation, but investment com-
panies are merely a pool of assets without employees or products. The 
                                                             
 36. Id. at 36. 
 37. See Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1416 (1970). 
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 41. Overview of Fund Governance Practices 1994–2012, INVESTMENT COMPANY INST., 
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role of the board is to manage the relationships between the company and 
its service providers, particularly its advisers and underwriters. In many 
respects, the board serves a compliance function and is not involved with 
strategy or the development of new products or services. Despite the 
SEC’s belief that the organization of an investment company board is a 
good model for all corporations, investment companies are highly regu-
lated financial vehicles and their use as a model for other corporate 
boards is questionable.  
C. Sarbanes–Oxley Reforms 
After the bursting of the technology stock market bubble of the 
1990s and the implosion of Enron and WorldCom,
42
 Congress passed 
Sarbanes–Oxley in 200243 in an effort to reform the corporate govern-
ance of public companies under the direction and supervision of the SEC. 
In June 2002, immediately prior to the passage of Sarbanes–Oxley, a 
committee of the NYSE, at the urging of the SEC, issued a report rec-
ommending changes to the NYSE listing standards.
44 
This report had a 
variety of recommendations for changes in NYSE listing standards that 
went beyond Sarbanes–Oxley, including: (i) requiring listed companies 
to have a majority of independent directors, with a stringent definition of 
the term “independent”; (ii) a provision for regularly scheduled executive 
sessions of boards chaired by a lead director or independent chairman; 
(iii) requiring listed companies to have nominating and compensation 
committees composed entirely of independent directors; and (iv) requir-
ing shareholder votes on equity-compensation plans. These recommenda-
tions were then transmitted to the NYSE board of directors, and several 
of them were filed with the SEC as proposed new listing standards. 
Sarbanes–Oxley gave the SEC the authority it had long wanted to 
restructure aspects of corporate governance, but it did so primarily by 
authorizing the SEC to direct self-regulatory organizations (SROs) to 
change their listing rules to meet certain standards.
45
 The law mandated 
that the SEC put into place requirements pertaining to the independence 
and functioning of public company boards—audit committee members, 
in particular—by ordering the NYSE and other SROs to make such re-
                                                             
 42. See Kathleen Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sar-
banes–Oxley, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 357 (2003). 
 43. See sources cited supra note 5. 
 44. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY AND LISTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE (2002) [hereinafter NYSE CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT], available at http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp_govreport.pdf. This pro-
ject was requested by the Chairman of the SEC. 
 45. Sarbanes–Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l (2002). 
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quirements part of their listing standards. In addition to regulating the 
manner in which audit committees are structured and function in a way 
that was not previously done, Sarbanes–Oxley made these regulations a 
matter of federal, rather than state, law. 
Because Sarbanes–Oxley greatly enlarged the scope of the Ex-
change Act as to specific matters of corporate governance, the SEC ac-
quired greater freedom to utilize SRO listing standards to accomplish 
corporate governance reform. In implementing Sarbanes–Oxley, the SEC 
has made ample use of this new authority, raising the interesting question 
of where the line between federal and state law should be drawn with 
respect to a corporation’s internal affairs. 
In addition to proposals that relate to audit committees, the NYSE 
proposed that non-management directors must meet at regularly sched-
uled executive sessions, and that nominating and compensation commit-
tees be composed entirely of independent directors.
46
 Nasdaq filed simi-
lar listing proposals with the SEC.
47
 The final SRO listing rules, as ap-
proved by the SEC for implementing Sarbanes–Oxley, include provi-
sions for independent board members for key committees; mandate ex-
ecutive sessions of non-management directors; define committee inde-
pendence for audit and nominating committee members; define audit 
committee financial experts; set forth specific size requirements and ob-
ligations of the audit committee; and require companies to have codes of 
business conduct and ethics.
48
 Continuing education for directors is also 
suggested.
49
 
                                                             
 46. See Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and 
Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Corporate Govern-
ance, Exchange Act Release No. 47672, 68 Fed. Reg. 19051 (Apr. 11, 2003). 
 47. Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National Association 
of Securities Dealers, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 48745, 81 SEC Docket 1586 (Nov. 4, 2003). 
 48. Self-Regulatory Organizations; New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and National Association 
of Securities Dealers, Inc.; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes (SR-NYSE-2002-33 and SR-
NASD-2002-141) and Amendments No. 1 Thereto; Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes (SR-
NASD-2002-77, SR-NASD-2002-80, SR-NASD-2002-138 and SR-NASD-2002-139) and Amend-
ments No. 1 to SR-NASD-2002-80 and SR-NASD-2002-139; and Notice of Filing and Order Grant-
ing Accelerated Approval of Amendment Nos. 2 and 3 to SR-NYSE-2002-33, Amendment Nos. 2, 
3, 4 and 5 to SR-NASD-2002-141, Amendment Nos. 2 and 3 to SR-NASD-2002-80, Amendment 
Nos. 1, 2, and 3 to SR-NASD-2002-138, and Amendment No. 2 to SR-NASD-2002-139, Relating to 
Corporate Governance, Exchange Act Release No. 48,745, 68 Fed. Reg. 64154 (Nov. 12, 2003). 
 49. Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Am. No. 1 
thereto by the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. Relating to Corporate Governance, File No. SR-
NYSE-2002-33, Exchange Act Release No. 47672, at *12 (Apr. 11, 2003) (director orientation and 
continuing education must be described in corporate governance guidelines); Self-Regulatory Organ-
izations; Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change and Amendment No. 1 Thereto by the American 
Stock Exchange LLC Relating to Enhanced Corporate Governance Requirements Applicable to 
Listed Companies, File No. SR-Amex-2003-65, Exchange Act Release No. 48706, at *10 (Oct. 27, 
 
786 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 37:775 
D. Dodd–Frank Reforms 
The restructured public company board, as mandated by Sarbanes–
Oxley, did little to prevent the financial meltdown of 2008. It has been 
argued that, leading up to the crisis, independent directors did not suffi-
ciently focus on or understand risk and risk management.
50
 However, 
rather than questioning the soundness of the independent director model 
in the wake of widespread corporate failures, the SEC pushed forward 
with its ideological preference for independent directors and so added 
provisions to this effect into Dodd–Frank.51 
Dodd–Frank further tightened the independence requirements for 
compensation committees, requiring that each member of compensation 
committees be independent and clarifying the standards by which com-
mittee members are determined to be independent.
52
 Additionally, Dodd–
Frank requires compensation committees to consider certain enumerated 
factors in selecting compensation consultants, legal counsel, or other ad-
visors to the committee, such as “the policies and procedures of the per-
son that employs the compensation consultant, legal counsel, or other 
adviser that are designed to prevent conflicts of interest.”53 
Some Dodd–Frank reforms reached beyond independent director 
requirements and fingered executive compensation as a cause of the fi-
nancial crisis. Dodd–Frank attempted to empower shareholders to curb 
risky behavior by managers by giving shareholders an advisory vote on 
executive compensation and golden parachutes.
54
 A claw-back provision 
for executive compensation based on erroneous financial statements was 
also inserted for public companies.
55
 With regard to financial institutions, 
Dodd–Frank required appropriate financial regulators to impose regula-
tions on such institutions to disclose the structures of all incentive-based 
compensation arrangements that could lead to material financial loss or 
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 53. Id. § 78j-3(b)(2)(C). 
 54. Id. § 78n-1. 
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would be excessive for executive officers, employees, directors, or prin-
ciple shareholders.
56
 
Dodd–Frank also directed the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve Board to issue regulations requiring each bank holding company 
with consolidated assets of greater than $10 billion, as well as each non-
bank financial company supervised by the Board of Governors, to estab-
lish a risk committee.
57
 The risk committee is responsible for the over-
sight of enterprise-wide risk management practices of the supervised 
company or bank holding company, and it is to include such a number of 
independent directors as the Board of Governors determines appropri-
ate.
58
 Additionally, the risk committees are to include at least one risk 
management expert having experience in identifying, assessing, and 
managing risk exposures of large, complex firms.
59
 This reform thus em-
phasizes expertise rather than independence.  
Misguided ratings for structured products were widely blamed for 
the 2008 financial crisis. In response, Dodd–Frank put into place new 
requirements for Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations 
(NRSROs).
60
 At least half of the board of an NRSRO must be comprised 
of independent directors.
61
 Further, a portion of the independent directors 
must include users of NRSRO ratings.
62
 
In order to be considered independent, a member of the board of an 
NRSRO may not, other than as a board member, accept any consulting, 
advisory, or other compensatory fee from the NRSRO or be associated 
with any affiliated company of the NRSRO.
63
 Additionally, a board 
member must be disqualified from any deliberation involving a specific 
rating in which the independent board member has a financial interest in 
the outcome of the rating.
64
 Finally, the compensation of these independ-
ent board members may not be linked to the business performance of the 
NRSRO, and the term of office of such a director is limited to five 
years.
65
 
Despite affirming the independent director model for compensation 
committees, Dodd–Frank sought to address capital market failures that 
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led to the 2008 financial crisis in ways that go beyond, or even contra-
dict, the usual SEC solution of mandating more independence for corpo-
rate board members. First, the statute and the financial regulators focus 
on the ability of directors to assess risk. Although firm stability and the 
interests of creditors are not synonymous, this focus on risk may lead 
creditor interests to trump shareholder interests in certain situations. Sec-
ond, in the case of NRSROs, the concept of independence is geared to 
directorial responsibility for the quality of a company’s products. Also, 
Dodd–Frank suggests a distinction in the shareholder primacy model be-
tween Main Street business corporations and financial institutions. Alt-
hough Dodd–Frank inserted the idea of directors with expertise on 
boards of financial institutions, it is uncertain whether the expert director 
model will migrate to boards of other kinds of companies. 
This Article focuses more on flaws in the independent director 
model for financial institutions than for industrial companies primarily 
because financial corporations failed so spectacularly in 2008. However, 
the failures of Enron and Worldcom, which were not financial institu-
tions, raise the question of whether the independent director model needs 
reexamination more generally. 
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR MODEL 
The installation of independent directors on the boards of public 
corporations is “grounded in the belief that outside directors are more 
effective than inside directors in monitoring management conduct”66 be-
cause independent directors’ incentives are more closely aligned with the 
goals of shareholders. Therefore, independent directors should maximize 
shareholder value by keeping a closer watch on executive management.
67
 
Independent directors are elected by shareholders so they are, in theory, 
“not beholden to the CEO.”68 The conventional wisdom is that independ-
ent directors will “reduce executive mismanagement, and decrease the 
likelihood of future corporate failure.”69 
The primary function of the independent director is to monitor the 
CEO and other executive officers to ensure that managers do not abuse 
their authority by engaging in self-dealing or fraud, or shirk their respon-
                                                             
 66. Thuy-Nga T. Vo, To Be or Not to Be Both CEO and Board Chair, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 65, 
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sibilities.
70
 Through oversight of management, independent directors are 
supposed to “detect and prevent fraud . . . and managerial shirking of 
responsibilities.”71 This in turn should “enhance corporate performance 
because they can proactively examine corporate affairs, not only to en-
sure that managers are productive, but also to ensure that managers make 
the most efficient and effective decisions.”72 
Nevertheless, “companies have continued to fail despite the ubiqui-
ty of the majority independent board and related committee structures.”73 
Some studies have shown that independent directors actually negatively 
affect corporations because they “are more likely to support management 
prerogatives than shareholder interests, [because] increasing outsider 
representation reduces research and development spending, and [be-
cause] an outsider-dominated board is more likely to award ‘golden par-
achutes’74 to the company’s executives.”75 A 2009 study by David 
Erkens et al. points to “the inadequacy of measures to make boards more 
accountable to shareholders and to increase the independence of 
boards.”76 The study examined 296 financial institutions in thirty differ-
ent countries that were at the heart of the 2008 financial crisis. The re-
sults showed that firms with more independent directors on their boards 
and a higher level of institutional ownership “experienced worse stock 
returns during the crisis period.”77 Professor Edward Rock has suggested 
that today’s directors may be too closely aligned with shareholder inter-
ests and insufficiently attuned to creditors’ interests.78 
Independent directors are part-time participants in a corporation’s 
affairs. By definition, they are outsiders. However intelligent, hardwork-
ing, or strong minded they may be, they do not have the time or the man-
date to challenge management’s judgments except as to a discrete num-
ber of issues. If they spend all of their time trying to audit the auditors 
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and assure that executive compensation is reasonable, they will have no 
time for focusing on important business and strategy matters. And if they 
become essentially full-time directors, they will no longer be independ-
ent. 
Independent directors are completely beholden to management for 
information. This dependence on insiders may give a CEO more power 
than was the case when a board included insiders. Moreover, the most 
informed outsiders may not be able to sit on a board due to antitrust or 
competitive constraints. 
If independent directors repeatedly challenge the judgments of a 
CEO, the CEO will lose his authority and be forced to resign. Corpora-
tions are essentially hierarchical and need a strong leader. The SEC has 
not necessarily respected the celebrity CEO, and activist shareholders 
today are doing their best to diminish the CEO’s authority.79 Indeed, in 
the struggle between management and shareholders, it appears that CEO 
power is being diminished.
80
 But some of the most highly regarded U.S. 
corporations have had authoritarian CEOs who have rewarded share-
holders over a long period of time.
81
 This does not mean that independent 
directors are a bad idea, but corporations should have greater freedom to 
experiment with board structures than they now have in the United States 
under federal law. Also, although the board of independent directors has 
been advocated in jurisdictions around the world, it might not be appro-
priate everywhere. Further, because the independent director board simp-
ly cannot carry the freight the SEC has placed upon it, it is bound to dis-
appoint, causing investor and public dissatisfaction and loss of confi-
dence. 
The collegial board has its flaws and there are times when man-
agement deserves to be challenged and even thrown out of office, but the 
model of mixed independent and non-independent directors actually 
served the U.S. economy well over a long period of time. The conse-
quences of changing this model to one where investors control the public 
corporation and a federal government agency controls board structure is 
problematic and did not prevent the 2008 financial meltdown. 
The tweaking of the independent director model for NRSROs is an 
interesting development. In the case of rating agencies, the purpose of 
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the independent director no longer seems to be acting on behalf of the 
shareholders as a check on management, but rather, is acting to insure the 
quality of the corporation’s product ratings. The NRSRO independent 
director would appear to be a director who can put a brake on the quest 
for corporate profits if necessary to improve ratings quality. This confus-
es the independent director model and makes one wonder whether the 
entire independent director concept needs rethinking. 
The SEC does not have general authority to regulate internal corpo-
rate affairs.
82
 Yet, state law does not require particular board structures, 
including whether or not any independent directors are required on 
boards or particular committees, such as the audit committee. Rather, 
state legislators have been silent on this issue so that corporations could 
deal with it flexibly and good corporate practices could develop over 
time.
83
 Courts have dealt with issues of board structure and independent 
directors in cases enforcing fiduciary duties
84 
or in other specific con-
texts, such as whether demand needs to be made in a derivative case.
85
 
Courts have generally encouraged boards to have independent directors 
by more carefully scrutinizing the actions of non-independent directors.
86
 
In some cases, state law has been more flexible than stock exchange def-
initions of independence, but in other situations state law has held rela-
tionships that would not fit within those definitions to demonstrate a lack 
of independence.
87
 If the SEC prevents the development of state law with 
regard to independent directors, state law is likely to atrophy. 
 
IV. SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND OTHER MODELS 
Shareholder primacy has been the dominant corporate governance 
theory since Berle and Dodd first debated it in the 1930s. However, the 
theory has recently begun to fall out of favor for several reasons. First, 
the theory is premised on the idea of shareholder homogeneity—the ex-
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istence of which is becoming increasingly rare. Second, the theory gives 
managers a short-term focus, rather than a focus on the long-term devel-
opment of the corporation, with its emphasis on shareholder value. In 
addition, shareholder primacy is thought to have resulted in increased 
risk taking by financial corporations, which led to the 2008 financial cri-
sis. Scholars continue to debate whether other theories of corporate gov-
ernance are better models than the dominant shareholder primacy ap-
proach. 
A. Shareholder Primacy 
The independent director model is intertwined with the shareholder 
primacy model. The shareholder primacy theory “derives from the con-
cept that the shareholders are the owners of the corporation and, as such, 
are entitled to control it, determine its fundamental policies, and decide 
whether to make fundamental shifts in corporate policy and practice.”88 
Under this theory, officers and directors are considered agents of the 
shareholders.
89
 They have a duty to maximize the financial value of the 
corporation in order to increase the value of the shareholders’ interest.90 
Essentially, shareholder primacy means that corporations exist to serve 
the economic interests of shareholders.
91
 
In addition to the ownership rationale that supports the shareholder 
primacy theory, proponents also point out that shareholders are the sole 
residual claimants of the corporation and, as such, “are in the best posi-
tion to exercise control for the good of all corporate constituents.”92 Be-
cause shareholders are not paid until after all other stakeholders receive 
their entitlements, shareholders must “exercise discretion in a way that 
maximizes value for the entire corporation.”93 
At one time, directors’ fiduciary duties were to the corporation and 
the body of shareholders as a whole. Because the SEC views its mandate 
as the protection of investors, it has changed this duty (for public compa-
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nies) to a direct duty by directors to shareholders. But the SEC’s mantra 
that it is the investors’ advocate is too narrow. Since 1996, an amend-
ment to the securities laws requires the SEC to consider efficiency, com-
petition, and capital formation in addition to the protection of investors.
94
 
One problem with the shareholder primacy theory is that it assumes 
the existence of “shareholder preference homogeneity”—that all share-
holders “have a single-minded interest in wealth maximization.”95 How-
ever, in recent years, it has become evident that not all shareholders share 
this common goal. Rather, “their interests diverge along a number of di-
mensions.”96 For example, some shareholders are in the control group 
while others are not. Non-employee shareholders often have different 
interests than employee and pension-holding shareholders. In addition, 
“time horizons” for wealth maximization vary among shareholders.97 
“Short-term and long-term shareholders often have strongly divergent 
goals, which is particularly relevant given the increasing role of activist 
short-term investors such as hedge funds.”98 And in instances where 
shareholder interests are aligned and they can agree on the definition of 
wealth maximization, they may still differ as to the best way to achieve 
that goal.
99 
One response to the lack of shareholder homogeneity is to move 
away from the shareholder primacy theory and move towards one of the 
board primacy theories. Because shareholder preferences are as diverse 
as those of the corporation’s other constituents, it is arguable that “corpo-
rate boards should be less responsive to shareholder interests[,] and more 
power and discretion should be accorded to these boards.”100 However, 
while shareholder heterogeneity may provide some support for a board 
primacy approach, “it is relevant to almost any feature of corporate gov-
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ernance that makes the system more or less responsive to the sharehold-
ers.”101 
Another criticism of the shareholder primacy theory is that it causes 
management to focus too much on short-term goals, like stock price, and 
pay less attention to the long-term development of the corporation.
102
 
The 2008 financial crisis “added more fuel to the debate about share-
holder empowerment.”103 Although recent legislation and rulemaking by 
the SEC has pushed “the trend toward more shareholder influence, we 
cannot rule out that the increased shareholder orientation of the past two 
decades is partly to blame for the [2008] events, given that pressure to 
produce more shareholder value may have led to more risk-taking, par-
ticularly in financial institutions.”104 
In Hurly-Berle-Corporate Governance, Commercial Profits, and 
Democratic Deficits, Allan C. Hutchison argues that there was “a failure 
on the part of regulators to appreciate that it was the single-minded focus 
on maximizing shareholder value that was at the heart of the [financial 
crisis].”105 According to Hutchison, “the corporation’s demise was fueled 
by the single-minded and irresponsible efforts by the management and 
board to inflate and maintain share prices and stock values.”106 Thus, it 
was the “continuing attachment to shareholder primacy [that] was as 
much the problem as the solution.”107 While Hutchison does not propose 
that any particular theory of corporate governance replace the sharehold-
er primacy norm, he does recommend the creation of a more democratic 
corporate governance approach through “limits on limited liability; a 
broadening of directors’ fiduciary duties; the increased representative-
ness of the board; and the enactment of substantive regulatory stand-
ards.”108 
The impact that financial institutions have on the real economy and 
the great recession that followed the 2008 Wall Street collapse should 
not be ignored in assessing shareholder primacy. Neither should other 
examples of corporate focus on shareholder gain resulting in anti-social 
conduct by large corporations. Shareholder primacy often drives public 
corporations to act in ways that are contrary to the interests of other con-
stituencies and the public generally. In the United States, the problems 
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created by operating corporations exclusively for shareholder gain have 
been ameliorated by broad regulatory statutes to protect such interests, 
e.g., food and drug safety, as well as environmental and employee safety. 
But the burden on business of such regulation is great, and it might be 
better if director focus on constituencies beyond shareholders could sub-
stitute for ever-increasing statutory and agency regulation. 
B. Board Primacy and Other Theories 
Proponents of the board primacy theory focus on advocating for 
greater board independence, rather than “advocating for greater share-
holder involvement.”109 According to Grant Hayden and Matthew Bodie, 
there are four primary board theories: the director primacy theory, the 
team production theory, the self-perpetuating board theory, and the quin-
quennial election model.
110
 
Under the first theory, director primacy theory of corporate law, di-
rectors must manage “the corporation according to their best judg-
ment.”111 According to one proponent of this theory, Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, “The chief economic virtue of the public corporation is . . . that it 
provides a hierarchical decision-making structure well-suited to the prob-
lem of operating a large business enterprise with numerous employees, 
managers, shareholders, creditors, and other constituencies.”112 Bain-
bridge and other director primacy advocates believe that this view of di-
rector conduct actually supports a “shareholder wealth maximization 
norm.”113 This view of director conduct supports a view of directors as 
“neutral mediating hierarchs.”114 Under this theory, directors “make sure 
that each corporate constituent receives adequate returns in light of their 
participation in the corporate endeavor.”115 Thus, “shareholder wealth 
maximization is no longer a mandate.”116 
According to Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, under the second the-
ory, the team production theory, the corporation is comprised of “a series 
of relationships”117 that “result in the joint production of goods or ser-
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vices that in turn create wealth.”118 In the context of these relationships, 
directors must be insulated and independent because they “serve as the 
ultimate authority when it comes to assigning responsibilities, mediating 
disputes, and divvying up the profits.”119 If the board were to favor one 
group over another, those in the unfavored group “would be less willing 
to make the proper investments of capital and labor to make the firm 
function.”120 Unlike proponents of the director primacy theory, Blair and 
Stout do not argue for shareholder wealth maximization. Instead, they 
argue that directors “owe a duty to the corporation and that the corpora-
tion consists of all of the stakeholders who are responsible for the busi-
ness of the enterprise.”121 
The third theory is the self-perpetuating board theory. This ap-
proach, which is chiefly supported by Lawrence Mitchell, argues that 
boards of public corporations should be self-perpetual and that the direc-
tors themselves should “fill the periodic vacancies resulting from death, 
resignation, and increases in board size by selecting the people to fill 
those vacancies.”122 Mitchell argues that this admittedly radical approach 
“would best free managers to manage the firm.”123 Mitchell advocates 
against any control by shareholders because such control causes directors 
to only focus on share price.
124
 By contrast, granting directors “complete 
freedom from shareholder oversight would ‘enable them to manage re-
sponsibly and for the long term.’”125 
Proponents of the fourth theory, the quinquennial election model of 
the corporation, “deplore the short-term focus that shareholder primacy 
brings to the corporation,” and instead establish a new framework that 
revolves around lengthening the terms of directors to five years.
126
 Dur-
ing their five-year terms, directors could only be fired for illegal conduct 
or “willful malfeasance.”127 Although directors would have the authority 
to approve mergers, acquisitions, and the like, these changes could only 
occur “at the time of the directors’ election.”128 In addition, directors 
would be required to present a detailed five-year corporate plan that 
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would be critiqued by independent advisors prior to the election. The 
director’s compensation would also be directly tied to the success or fail-
ure of the plan.
129
 
In Questioning Authority: The Critical Link Between Board Power 
and Process, Professor Nicola Faith Sharpe discusses an additional theo-
ry of corporate control—managerialism.130 Under this theory lies the as-
sumption that managers “run the firm free from any significant influence 
of the boards.”131 Advocates of this theory place the ultimate right of 
corporate control in the hands of managers, not directors or sharehold-
ers.”132 While discussions about this approach have diminished in mod-
ern corporate governance scholarship, there is practical evidence that the 
theory is in use. For example, CEOs have control over the selection of 
directors, over the board meeting agendas, and because of information 
asymmetry, the CEOs also have control over the amount and nature of 
the directors’ knowledge and information about the corporation.133 
C. Stakeholder Theory 
Under the stakeholder theory, which is similar to the team-
production theory, officers and directors’ fiduciary obligations flow not 
only to the shareholders of the corporation, but also to “nonshareholder 
constituents whose interests are affected by corporate action.”134 “The 
heart of stakeholder theory is that corporations affect a variety of indi-
viduals and groups who have a ‘stake’ in the firm.”135 Because the corpo-
ration “benefits from the fruits of those individuals and groups,” man-
agement has a “reciprocal duty to them.”136 Thus, managers have “broad-
er obligations to balance the interests of shareholders with the interests 
and concerns of [stakeholders].”137 Stakeholders, unlike shareholders, are 
those people with whom corporate “[m]anagers regularly deal with: em-
ployees, regarding work performance and working conditions; suppliers, 
concerning the quality of the goods delivered and non-delivery of goods; 
customers, who complain about the goods that the corporation markets; 
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and local communities, concerning what the corporation is doing or not 
doing as a corporate citizen.”138 By taking into account all stakeholders’ 
interests, “managers gain respect and trust in the eyes of stakeholders; 
and, importantly for the corporation, they can do their job better and 
more efficiently.”139 
The stakeholder theory competes with shareholder primacy because 
shareholder primacy “pushes managers to exploit non-shareholders in 
pursuit of shareholder gains.”140 For example, “directors can put down-
ward pressure on wages and benefits for corporate employees”141 in order 
to increase shareholder wealth. In addition, “unlike shareholder primacy, 
no grouping has prima facie priority over another, and no group warrants 
priority over any other groups.”142 
Some commentators have argued that “for a corporation to be truly 
sustainable, it will have to adopt a stakeholder, rather than a shareholder, 
value approach.”143 Robert Sprague argues that shareholder wealth max-
imization occurs in the long run when “managers act in the best interests 
of those who also have a stake in the success of the corporation—such as 
employees, suppliers, customers, and society. If corporate activities pro-
mote a healthy society, that society, in return, can support an environ-
ment conducive to business growth.”144 
The anti-takeover statutes passed by many states in response to the 
takeover mania of the 1980s were based on a stakeholder theory. Some 
of these statutes allow directors to consider constituencies other than 
shareholders when confronted with a hostile takeover.
145
 Other statutes 
allow such considerations for any and all directorial decisions.
146
 These 
statutes have been upheld as not preempted by the federal securities laws, 
which expressed a principle of neutrality as between bidders and target 
companies. Although these other constituency statutes were passed at the 
behest of labor interests because of the large-scale firings that generally 
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followed takeovers,
147
 they could be utilized more generally to protect 
employee and other interests against shareholder interests.
148
 
The Stewardship Code
149
 adopted in the United Kingdom after the 
financial crisis may change the shareholder-centric perspective of U.K. 
law to a stakeholder perspective, at least for financial institutions. Fur-
ther, because of the existence of depositor insurance or bailouts by the 
state, the government is recognized as a key stakeholder who may be 
more concerned about the public interest than shareholder interests.
150
 
Recently, many states have made provisions for the incorporation 
of benefit and flexible purpose corporations, which straddle a space be-
tween for-profit and non-profit corporations. The benefit corporation 
commits its owners to pursue social or philanthropic objectives, although 
shareholder profits may also be pursued. However, there is no obligation 
to give shareholders priority.
151
 Flexible purpose corporations similarly 
would allow customers, the community, or society to trump shareholder 
interests.
152
 These statutes are an updated version of the other constituen-
cy statues, and their use is an indication that at least some entrepreneurs 
eschew the model of managing a corporation exclusively for shareholder 
gain. 
D. Bank Boards 
After the 2008 financial crisis, regulators in the United States and 
Europe gave greater attention to the corporate governance of banks. 
Dodd–Frank required large bank holding companies to establish a risk 
committee. Similarly, the EU draft Capital Requirements Directive man-
dates that banks establish a risk committee composed of members of the 
management body who do not perform any executive functions at the 
bank.
153
 The management body is defined as the governing body of a 
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 148. Roberta S. Karmel, Implications of the Stakeholder Model, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1156 
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corporation, comprising of the supervisory and the managerial functions 
with ultimate decision-making authority.
154
 
Under the corporate law of the United States, directors do not gen-
erally owe a duty to creditors, with the possible exception of when the 
corporation is on the verge of insolvency.
155
 This proposition was tested 
during the takeover battles of the 1980s and was maintained in several 
cases.
156
 Yet, at one time, bank directors were held to have duties to de-
positors of the bank, and bank deposits in the United States are insured 
by the FDIC.
157
 Similarly, directors of failed banks were even subject to 
some personal liability.
158
 The concern after the 2008 financial crisis is, 
rightly, to prevent future bank insolvencies. Although risk committees 
are one response, explicitly charging directors with a duty to depositors 
would be another appropriate response. 
As discussed above, Dodd–Frank did effect some changes in the 
corporate governance of financial institutions, particularly with regard to 
executive compensation.
159
 European thinking has progressed further in 
this regard to focus on the short-term thinking and behavior of investors 
and attempt to impose stewardship duties on investors in financial insti-
tutions in order to curb risky managerial behavior.
160
 Improved monitor-
ing of corporate governance codes in the public interest is suggested. In 
addition, shareholders, as stewards, should be looking at the long-term 
viability of the corporation with the interests of the state as a lender of 
last resort in mind.
161
 
Most of the corporate governance reforms for bank and public 
company boards have focused on director independence, although execu-
tive compensation and the establishment of risk committees have re-
ceived some attention. Nevertheless, the populist response to the 2008 
financial crisis has failed to address the role of equity market pressures in 
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risk-taking by financial institutions.
162
 Indeed, there is some evidence 
that shareholders supported higher leverage and risky conduct by banks 
in order to generate higher returns.
163
 Therefore, giving shareholders 
more power over bank management does not seem to be a valid solution 
to the problems of bank failure. Further, relying on independent directors 
to monitor managers with regard to their remuneration is futile if share-
holders appoint the members of the compensation committee.
164
 There-
fore, conferring the power to appoint members of the compensation 
committee upon debt holders might be a better solution.
165
 
F. Further Problems When the Government Is a                                    
Shareholder or Stakeholder 
In emerging economies, especially the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China) countries, former state owned enterprises (SOEs) that have 
been fully or partially privatized have been listed on national or foreign 
stock exchanges and have become subject to independent director re-
quirements. Nevertheless, where the government remains a major stock-
holder, questions remain as to what independence means and how inde-
pendent a director can be. 
A similar issue has arisen with regard to public companies in which 
the U.S. government and European governments took a major stake as a 
stockholder, a bondholder, or otherwise during the 2008 financial crisis. 
From 2008 to 2009, the U.S. government’s portfolio of securities in pri-
vate sector companies increased 282% from $340.4 billion to $959.9 bil-
lion.
166
 As of June 1, 2010, the U.S. government held equity positions of 
either preferred or common shares in five major corporations (AIG, 
Chrysler, Citigroup, GM, and GMAC) and in Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac.
167
 Similarly, the U.K. government became a major shareholder of 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and Lloyds Banking Group, amongst oth-
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er banks.
168
 These holdings were considered antithetical to Anglo-Saxon 
capitalism;
169
 therefore, it was thought that the government should not 
act like an ordinary commercial shareholder, but rather, a reluctant one. 
The preference of both the U.S. and U.K. governments was for a short 
holding period during which the government should not control day-to-
day management decision making.
170
 
Nevertheless, certain inherent conflicts between the government as 
a stockholder, committed to protecting taxpayer interests, and other gov-
ernmental roles, such as the government as regulator of financial institu-
tions, became apparent.
171
 Additionally, there was a conflict between the 
goal of stabilizing the financial and housing markets and early divest-
ment. Therefore, gaining concessions from management, labor, and cred-
itors became a priority and exerting control over management also oc-
curred.
172
 The U.S. government limited executive compensation and div-
idend payments.
173
 The government also mandated the appointment of 
new board members and executive officers more directly and more suc-
cessfully than is generally accomplished by an institutional investor or 
private equity fund.
174
 So, even limited government ownership raises the 
question as to what director independence means when the government is 
a major investor in a company. 
In the context of government ownership, independence should 
mean not only independence from the management of the company but 
also independence from the majority stockholder. Yet, when the gov-
ernment appoints, or at least approves, the directors, the directors are not 
realistically independent of government control.
175
 As a political actor, 
the government is in a position to pick the winners and losers among var-
ious corporate and other constituencies. The government may well not 
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operate private sector companies with a view to maximize wealth, but 
rather may be seeking to achieve other goals. These problems and the 
doubts they raise about the viability of independent directors are readily 
apparent, even in a situation such as the temporary taking of equity posi-
tions in banks and other companies during the 2008 financial crisis. The 
issue of how independent directors can be independent becomes even 
more interesting in the case of long-term government holdings in partial-
ly privatized companies in other countries. 
V. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES 
A. Europe 
Europe has employed different corporate governance models. For 
example, Germany has two-tier boards, with employee representation on 
the second tier. Conversely, the United Kingdom has boards of directors 
and directorial fiduciary duties similar to the United States. The U.K. 
Cadbury Code of 1992, however, led to a split between the executive and 
non-executive directors. Since the non-executive directors, in theory, 
supervise the executive directors, the requirements for non-executive 
directors serve to harmonize the one-tier and two-tier board structures.
176
 
Independence of directors at the board level became a paradigm in Eu-
rope at the beginning of the twenty-first century and was included as a 
recommendation in the Action Plan of the European Commission in 
2003.
177
 In particular, the codes recommended a majority of independent 
directors for the audit, nominating, and compensation committees.
178
 
In the United Kingdom, independence standards are contained in 
the Corporate Governance Code of 2010 and prior codes. Independence 
is not affirmatively defined and is determined by the board.
179
 The use of 
codes to encourage independent board members was endorsed by the 
European Commission in 2005.
180
 Accordingly, the issue of having a 
substantial number, and often a majority, of independent directors is gen-
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erally covered by “comply or explain” corporate governance codes.181 
There are few mandatory requirements, although under an EU directive, 
at least one member of the audit committee must be independent.
182
 
In Germany, supervisory board members are non-executive by def-
inition, but they are not necessarily independent.
183
 An important issue is 
the definition of independence. An EU Green Paper defines independent 
as “free of any business, family or other relationship, with the company, 
its controlling shareholder or the management of either, that creates a 
conflict of interest such as to impair his judgment.”184 The question of 
whether a representative of a controlling shareholder is independent is 
important in Europe and other countries, but it has not been a focus in the 
United States. In several European countries a representative of a 10% 
shareholder is not considered independent.
185
 
In Europe, the financial crisis has led to a skeptical view of the val-
ue of director independence as opposed to other qualities a director 
should have. This view is more pervasive than it has been in the United 
States and is especially pronounced in regard to the boards of financial 
institutions. According to an EU Green Paper, the non-executive direc-
tors of financial institutions did not devote sufficient resources or time to 
their duties; did not come from sufficiently diverse backgrounds; did not 
carry out a serious appraisal of their performance; and were unable or 
unwilling to ensure that the risk management of their companies was ap-
propriate.
186
 
Because shortcomings in corporate governance led to some of the 
problems at financial institutions during the crisis, debates in Europe 
have moved away from independent directors and have turned to other 
criteria for boards. One problem with the independent director model is a 
downplaying of competence. Recent debates in Europe about board 
composition focus on expertise and diversity as much as independ-
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ence.
187
 Especially for financial firms, there is a need for expertise so the 
board can effectively discharge its responsibilities.
188
 
The most recent European Commission Action Plan on corporate 
governance of listed companies has recommended enhanced transparen-
cy, shareholder engagement, and company growth and competitive-
ness.
189
 Director independence is ignored or, at best, subsumed under a 
concern about conflict-of-interest transactions. Improved implementation 
of the “comply or explain” policy of the corporate governance codes is 
recommended, which could strengthen the independence of directors.
190
 
Yet, the first item discussed in the Action Plan with regard to transparen-
cy is disclosure of board diversity policy and management of non-
financial risks.
191
 Although diversity is advocated in order to limit group-
think and challenge management, it is also related to the Commission 
proposal on improving gender balance on boards.
192
 The debates about 
diversity are a push for more women on corporate boards in Europe. In 
some countries, such diversity has been mandated, but other countries 
have rejected required diversity.
193
 
The financial crisis of 2008, the subsequent sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe, and the LIBOR scandal may serve to orient boards and regula-
tors in the direction of demanding more director competence, especially 
with regard to risk identification and management. These new desired 
attributes for board members in Europe—expertise and diversity—are 
likely to reduce independence as a priority. Furthermore, independence 
may actually contribute to the lack of meaningful involvement by non-
executive directors. Accordingly, insider knowledge and experience may 
be required for effective board participation in the decision making of 
firms, especially financial firms.
194
 
B. China 
In China, the opening of the capital markets to foreign investment 
has not led to a full implementation of corporate governance principles, 
nor has it led to shareholder primacy. Nevertheless, securities regulators 
in China and Hong Kong have implemented formal requirements for di-
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rector independence. As will be discussed below, two elements intrinsic 
to the formation of capital within China have prevented shareholder pri-
macy from taking root: extensive government involvement and relation-
based governance. Both elements are interrelated and work together to 
trump shareholder primacy as a focus of Chinese corporate directors. 
The Company Law of China was passed in the 1990s and adopted a 
two-tiered board structure, similar to the German corporate governance 
model, with a board of directors and a board of supervisors. Employee 
representatives may sit on both boards.
195
 As the capital markets grew, 
the regulatory framework expanded to encourage capital formation and 
the privatization of traditional state-owned enterprises into joint stock 
companies.
196
 The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 
in China and the Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China were 
passed to regulate the corporate governance of the newly minted corpo-
rate entities. The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies 
maintains multiple provisions regarding directors and their independ-
ence, including rules for related party transactions and independent direc-
tors.
197
 In addition, various financial regulators, including the China Se-
curities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), and the exchanges regulate 
these public companies.
198
 
The Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China 
requires listed companies to be operated “in an independent manner” 
with directors “independent from the listed company that employs them 
and the company’s major shareholders.”199 Further, the Code of Corpo-
rate Governance for Listed Companies encourages directors to “diligent-
ly perform their duties for the best interests of the company and all the 
shareholders.”200 The exchanges, in an attempt to promote international 
investment, have adopted even more stringent requirements for inde-
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pendent directors. For example, the Hong Kong exchange (HKEx) re-
quires that an issuer have at least three independent directors, which must 
comprise one-third of the board members.
201
 Independence is further de-
fined as owning less than 1% of the shares, although exchange approval 
can occur for those owning less than 5%; not having worked as a princi-
pal or partner for an advisor to the issuer or controlling shareholder with-
in one year of becoming a director; not having a material interest in the 
activities of the corporation; and not being a direct relative (child, sib-
ling, or parent) of a chief executive or substantial shareholder.
202
 These 
requirements, while better than none, are insufficient to prevent the ex-
ploitation of minority shareholders by the countervailing forces of gov-
ernment prerogatives and related party transactions. 
Chinese companies maintain an obligation to consider the general 
welfare of the PRC
203
 and not only the welfare of minority or public 
shareholders; therefore, independence does not have the same meaning 
as in the United States.
204
 Independence of directors in Chinese compa-
nies does not equate to independence from government interference of 
corporate governance. Chinese corporations have a general mandate to 
take state priorities into account for their operations. Moreover, the state 
is a controlling shareholder in a large majority of listed Chinese compa-
nies.
205
 As a result, Chinese companies and state owned enterprises have 
similar social responsibilities and are viewed as vehicles for state control 
over certain industries, rather than drivers of capital markets deriving 
profits for their shareholders. 
While advocating for increased shareholder returns in a 2012 inter-
view, former CSRC Commissioner Guo Shuqing acknowledged Chinese 
corporate directors’ low priority for investor returns among other com-
peting interests.
206
 Despite pressure for independence from the govern-
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ment in the capital markets, directors are unlikely to promote shareholder 
gain over state prerogatives. The continued divergence from the tradi-
tional Western corporate objective of shareholder gain stems from the 
directors of Chinese corporations frequently being bureaucrats and poli-
ticians that view their fiduciary duty as being towards the state instead of 
the company’s shareholders.207 With that viewpoint, directors have lim-
ited incentive to maximize profit potential, as there is limited political 
payout for modestly increasing a company’s profits.208 Instead, the direc-
tors represent the state’s interests in a variety of ways, including main-
taining depressed prices for essential products, enforcing state birth con-
trol policies among employees, and pursuing an urban full-employment 
policy.
209
 Furthermore, where politically connected chief executives are 
concerned, the board of directors face increased challenges in monitoring 
and disciplining the management of the company.
210
 
In addition to state owned or dominated enterprises, non-state 
owned companies exist in China and Hong Kong. Many are controlled 
by family members or small groups that in turn control large segments of 
the Chinese economy.
211
 The controlling family members and their rep-
resentatives on boards of directors negatively impact the minority share-
holders through increased agency costs.
212
 Majority stakeholders are 
rarely encumbered by corporate governance structures and are able to 
place directors on the board of the company.
213
 In order to get around the 
independence requirements, such as those of the HKEx, family conglom-
erates use non-relative family representatives, entrusted to represent the 
family’s interests, to promote their interests on the board of directors 
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above those of minority shareholders.
214
 The control of these sharehold-
ers is exacerbated by the low presence of institutional shareholders with 
sufficient shares to place members on the boards of directors to challenge 
self-dealing transactions.
215
 Even with an increased size of board of di-
rectors, an increase in the number of independent directors, or both, no 
impact is made on the occurrence of related party transactions.
216
 Only 
the increase in control rights held by the second to tenth largest investors 
acts as an offset to related party transactions.
217
 
The primacy of the state over shareholders and the low presence of 
institutional investors allow continued related party transactions to divert 
funds from the companies’ shareholders. Independent directors are 
deemed ineffective in preventing either problem because directors main-
tain a loyalty to the state above the shareholder. Further, if the state is not 
the majority shareholder, the director is in place due to another large 
stakeholder. Either way, the independent directors are ineffective at rep-
resenting any interests but those of the largest stakeholders. 
Despite the weakness of Chinese corporate law in protecting minor-
ity shareholders, the CSRC has made significant strides in altering corpo-
rate governance for listed companies with regard to the independence of 
directors and other shareholder protection devices. The CSRC had inject-
ed corporate fiduciary duties into Chinese law for controlling sharehold-
ers, which may be a state or party organ.
218
 Further, the provisions with 
regard to independent directors came from the CSRC.
219
 How the Chi-
nese independent director will develop remains to be seen, but independ-
ence does not have the same meaning as it does in the United States or 
Europe. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The independent director model advocated by the SEC has been ac-
cepted in many jurisdictions, either as a mandatory requirement for pub-
lic companies or a recommended structure. Yet, boards of independent 
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directors did not prevent the scandals of Enron, WorldCom, and other 
companies in the United States and in Europe after the bursting of the 
technology bubble of the 1990s. Such boards also failed to prevent the 
financial institution meltdowns of 2008. Thus, a rethinking of this model 
is necessary. 
Although inside or executive directors may have conflicts of inter-
est, they are more knowledgeable than outsiders and more involved in 
making business decisions for the corporation, both short-term and long-
term. Their most serious conflicts-of-interest decisions relate to compen-
sation, but where directors and officers are both compensated, in whole 
or in part, on the basis of contingent stock awards, insiders and outsiders 
have similar conflicts. Further, such compensation has resulted in share-
holder primacy run amuck. It also encouraged the risk taking that result-
ed in the 2008 financial crisis. Accordingly, shareholder primacy also 
needs to be reexamined. 
Since 2008, director diligence and expertise have been areas of fo-
cus, but a board of independent directors remains dependent on a corpo-
ration’s management for information. Regulation cannot compel those 
personal qualities that make a director excellent—intelligence, integrity, 
experience, competence, and a willingness to question herd decision 
making. Also, a public corporation should not be a battleground where 
executives, directors, and shareholders are adversaries. Neither should 
the board of directors become a super-compliance committee, more con-
cerned about government regulations than a corporation’s operations and 
strategy. 
Public corporations should have a mix of independent and non-
independent directors with directors having a duty to the corporation as a 
whole. The interests of employees, customers, and creditors should be 
balanced against a duty to shareholders, especially when those share-
holder interests are short-term. Although such complicated duties may 
prove more difficult to enforce than a simple duty to obtain economic 
gain for shareholders, shareholder primacy has brought business to a sor-
ry pass, especially in the United States where our industrial base has 
been seriously impaired and speculation in the financial markets has 
wreaked havoc on the real economy. Only an experienced, competent, 
and fully informed board can possibly help to steer a forward course for 
public corporations in our complex global economy. The board needs to 
be informed by expert and responsible insiders (including service pro-
viders to the firm such as commercial bankers, lawyers, and retired com-
pany officers) with a stake in the future of the corporation, as well as in-
dependent outsiders who have the expertise and ability to both question, 
challenge, and advise management. 
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In the United States and elsewhere, “independence” now carries a 
statutory or stock exchange definition that has frequently led to the selec-
tion of former government officials, other famous personalities, educa-
tors, and CEOs from other companies who meet the definition of inde-
pendence but who are not sufficiently expert or diverse to assist in the 
creation of overall firm value. The qualities that make a director truly 
independent do not come from a statutory definition but rather come 
from intelligence, experience, and a strong sense of ethical responsibility. 
The ability to challenge the conventional wisdom, to tell truth to power, 
is rare, and even rarer is the director who can do so but not destroy the 
collegiality of the boardroom. Yet, seeking such individuals should be 
the object of director selection. 
 
